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RATE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES IN REGULATED
INDUSTRIES
By EDWARD DUmBAULDt
Largely because of the institution - of two important antitrust suits
against railroads, 2 considerable polemic literature has appeared of late,
voicing the sentiments entertained by spokesmen for the railroad indus-
try with respect to the applicability of the antitrust laws to that indus-
try.3 These writers disapprove of the enforcement of the antitrust laws
against carriers. They sometimes claim that the antitrust laws do not
apply to regulated industries; in this connection they tend to ignore
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and to overemphasize the
extent to which railroad rate-making is in fact subject to regulation by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. They assert that the antitrust
laws should not apply to railroad rate-making, and they favor legislative
proposals seeking exemption and immunity from the antitrust laws.
4
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and articles in legal periodicals. Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the
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The views herein expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect
those of any governmental agency.
I. Certain abortive investigations which were terminated before institution of liti-
gation likewise aroused interest in the question of antitrust enforcement against car-
riers. See WIPRUD, JUsTIcE IN TRANSPORTATION 88 (1945); Hearings before the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate on S. 942, 78th Cong., ist
Sess.. 228-237 (1943). (This document will hereafter be cited as "S. 942, Hearings.")
2. In United States v. Association of American Railroads, Civil No. 246 (D. Neb.
x944) the government filed its complaint on August 23, 1944. On September 27, 1945,
the court denied defendants' motions to dismiss. 4 F. R. D. 51o (D. Neb. 1945).
In Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. M., 324 U. S. 439 (945), the State of Georgia
sought leave to file an amended bill of complaint dated September 15, 1944. On March
26, 1945, leave was granted by the court. On December 17, 1945, a master was ap-
pointed, who received evidence at hearings on March 18, 1946. and June 4-August 20,
1946.
3. A judicious statement of the carriers' views by an eminent lawyer, formerly
Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Antitrust Division,
now General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, is found in an address
delivered on June 6, 1945: Dickinson, Railroad Rates and the Antitrust Laws, 12 1. C. C.
PRAC. J. 936-951 (1945). A more extreme expression is given by the Illinois Central's
Senior General Attorney: Smith, Rate-Making and the Antitrust Law, 119 RAILWAY
AGE 208 (1945), reprinted in 12 I. C. C. PRAC. J. 1117 (1945). Mr. Smith later made
the Supreme Court, as well as the Department of Justice, a target of his defiunciation:
Smith, The Interstate Commerce Commnision, the Departmnent of Justice, and the
Supreme Court, 36 Am. EcoN. REV. 479-493 (May 1946). One of the defense coun-
sel in the case at Lincoln has recently added his contribution to the subject: DRAYTON,
TRANSPORTATION UNDER Two MASTERS (1946).
4. For the recent proposals of that sort, see S. 94, Hearings; Hearings before
Committee on Interstate Contmerce on H. R. 2536, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). (This
document will hereafter be cited as "H. R. 2536, Hearings.") As to similar unsuccess-
ful attempts in 191o and 1914, see WIIU, op. cit. supra, note I, at 111-113.
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It will be the purpose of this article to examine the validity of the
claims made on behalf of the carriers. This examination will be made
on the basis of respect for existing law as established by judicial deci-
sions, and upon the basis of accepting as sound and desirable the eco-
nomic policy of competition and free enterprise, as embodied for over
half a century in the antitrust laws.5
I
RATE-FIXING AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Price-fixing combinations or conspiracies are prohibited as per se
violations of the antitrust laws, without regard to the reasonableness of
the prices fixed.6 Rate-fixing is obviously one species of price-fixing.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court concluded in -
the Georgia case that "conspiracies among carriers to fix rates were
included in the broad sweep of the Sherman Act." 7 There was no
novelty in this decision-the Court had long ago enunciated the doctrine
in the Freight Association cases."
Many arguments have been and still are being advanced by railroad
spokesmen to escape the effect of the holding in the Freight Association
cases. It is sometimes suggested that the authority of those cases has
been weakened by the subsequent establishment of the "rule of reason"
in the interpretation of the Sherman Act. This doctrine was enunciated
in the Standard Oil case.9 Here the court construed the general words
of the Sherman Act, which forbade every restraint of trade 1 I as mean-
ing that Congress had intended to outlaw only those restraints of trade
which were found to be unreasonable.11 Thus it will be noted that the
5. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (I890), 15 U. S. C. § I (1940), pro-
hibited restraint of trade and monopoly. The anti-pooling provisions of § 5 of the Act
to Regulate Commerce, of February 4, 1887, 24 STAT. 379, 380, 49 U. S. C. § I (1940),
may be regarded as the beginning of federal antitrust legislation. "The Sherman Act,
with reference to the Commerce Act, is practically supplemental legislation. Its effect
and operation is to broaden the provisions of.Section 5 so as to embrace not only car-
riers, but manufacturers and producers as well." SNYDE, THE INTERSTATE ComMERcE
AcT AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 122 (1904).
6. United States v. Trenton Potteries Company, 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United
States v. Socony-Vacuutn Oil Company, 310 U. S. 150 (1940). Regarding per se vio-
lations see HODGES, THE ANTITRUST Acr AND THE SUPREME COURT 16 et seq. (St.
Paul, Minn., 1941).
7. Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 456 (1945).
8. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290, 341 (1897) and
United States v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 565, 570, 577 (1898). Accord:
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. . 197, 327 (1904) ; United States
v. Terminal Railroad Assoc. of St. Louis, 224 U. S. 383, 394, 4o9 (1912); United
States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61, 85 (1912); United States v. Southern
Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214, 229-231 (1922).
9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. I (1gio).
IO. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
ii. In so holding the Court overrode not merely the language of the statute, tut
the clear intent of Congress and its own previous decisions as well. No less than
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Standard Oil case impaired only that part of the Freight Association
cases which dealt with the question whether all restraints of trade, or
only those that were unreasonable, were prohibited by the Sherman Act.
The question whether the antitrust laws apply to transportation (a
question which was expressly raised and decided affirmatively in the
Freight Association cases) was not involved in the Standard Oil case.
Nor was the Court's decision in the Freight Association cases with
respect to the illegality of price-fixing weakened by the "rule of
reason." 12
Another argument advanced is that the Freight Association cases
were decided a long time ago (in 1897 and 1898), and that conditions
then were wholly different from those existing today. In connection
with this argument, those who advance it point out that the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not then possess the extensive powers which
it now has to prescribe rates.' 3 It is obvious that this type of specula-
tion, as to what it may be imagined the Supreme Court would have held
in the Freight Association cases if the Commission's powers at that date
had been the same as those which it possesses today, 4 completely dis-
regards and ignores the actual holding and decision which the Court
in fact rendered in those cases. Mr. Drayton's discussion in effect
amounts to a reargument of the Freight Association cases. Similarly,
his argument that the legislative history of the Sherman Act shows that
it was not intended to apply to transportation 15 is in essence merely an
assertion that those cases were wrongly decided.
Another argument advanced to weaken the force of the decision in
the Freight Association cases is that the agreements there held illegal
contained stronger coercive sanctions against dissenting carriers than
those in effect today.' 6 This contention rests upon an incorrect inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws. An illegal price-fixing conspiracy may
three times the Supreme Court had refused to qualify the Sherman Act by adopting
the "rule of reason." The doctrine was first rejected in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Assoc., x66 U. S. 29o (1897). After deliberation a rehearing of this
case was denied, and its holding was followed in United States v. Joint Traffic Assoc.,
171 U. S. 505 .(I898) and Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. i97
(904). Congress likewise refused to adopt amendments inserting the word "reason-
able" in the statute. Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 231, 244-5 (1938).
,z. Twenty instances, prior to the Georgia case, in which the Supreme Court has
cited the Freight Association cases are listed in WIPRUD, op. cit. supra, note I at 176-
18i.
13. Smith, supra note 3 in 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at iiug; DRAYTON, op. cit. supra,
note 3, at 23 et seq. It was held in Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. N. 0. &
T. P. P R., 67 U. S. 479 (1897), that the Commission had no power to prescribe
rates. Power to prescribe maximum rates was conferred by the Hepburn Act of June
29, 1906, 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § i (194o).
14. See DRAYToN, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 29.
15. Id. at 13, 21. For a different interpretation of the legislative history of the
Sherman Act see WmRum, op. cit. supra note i, at xio-iii.
x6. DRAYTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26, 27, 50.
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exist, even though no coercive powers are conferred upon the combina-
tion so as to enable it to enforce the price-fixing agreement against
recalcitrant members. The mere fact that present-day methods are less
crude and more subtle does not necessarily relieve them from the taint
of illegality.17
II
THE SCOPE OF COMMISSION REGULATION
As the Supreme Court aptly observed in the Georgia case: "Regu-
lated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act." 18 It is
necessary to consider the scope and extent of the regulatory powers con-
ferred by law upon the Commission.
It is of course undeniable that Congress in the exercise of its power
to regulate commerce may depart from the general rule of competition
which it has established in the antitrust laws,' 9 and may establish a
different regime for particular segments of the national economy.2 0  It
is true that certain limitations upon completely free competition are
embodied in the existing regulatory provisions of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Thus before new operations may be instituted, a certificate
of public convenience and necessity must be obtained from the Commis-
sion.21 Moreover, while it is the duty of each common carrier to initi-
ate its own rates,22 the carrier's freedom of action is limited by the legal
requirements that the rates established must be "just and reasonable," 23
must not cause "unjust discrimination," 24 or "undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage" or "undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
17. The boundary between such concerted action as is permissible under the anti-
trust laws and that which is forbidden is usually determined by comparison and study
of the following leading cases: American Column and Lumber Company v. United
States, 257 U. S. 377 (921) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Company, 262
U. S. 371 (1923); Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association v. United States, 268
U. S. 563 (1925); Cement Manufacturers' Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588
(1925) ; Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (936). See statement of
Assistant Attorney General Berge in H. R. 2536, Hearings, 78I, 784, 786. Railroad
lawyers are as capable as counsel for any other industry to determine the scope of
allowable collaboration. The alleged necessity of additional legislation to eliminate
confusion is imaginary.
18. 324 U. S. at 456 (1945).
ig. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397 (1927) ; Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 337-8 (904).
20. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 11, 128 (i942); Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Company v. Adkins, 3IO U. S. 381, 394-6 (940); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Company, 310 U. S. 150, 226 (940) ; United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative,
307 U. S. 533, 569-70 (939)
21. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (i8) (1940), so provides
with respect to railroads. Similar provisions with respect to motor and water carriers
are found in 49 U. S. C. §§ 306, 3o7, gog (i94o).
22. Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 US. 439, 459 (i945) ; United States
v. Chicago. Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific R. R., 294 U. 5. 499. 5o6 (i935) ; Arizona
Grocery Company v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932).
23. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § I (5) (a) (940).
24. Ibid. 49 U. S. C. at §2.
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advantage." 25 If in an appropriate proceeding the Commission finds
that an established or proposed rate violates these or other requirements
of the Act, it may prescribe the maximum or minimum, or maximum
and minumum, or the precise rate to be charged.26 Furthermore, fol-
lowing the financial plight of the railroads after the first World War,
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act was amended with a view to
encouraging mergers of rail carriers. Accordingly the Commission was
empowered to approve and authorize pooling agreements and acquisi-
tions of control found by it to be "in the public interest." Transactions
so approved are relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws.
2 7
But as the Supreme Court stated in the Georgia case with respect
to the Commission's authority:
"It has the power to lift the ban of the antitrust laws in favor of
carriers who merge or consolidate . . . and the duty to give
weight to the antitrust policy of the nation before approving mer-
gers and consolidations. . . . But Congress has not given the
Commission comparable authority to remove rate-fixing combina-
tions from the prohibitions contained in the anti-trust laws.
"The type of regulation which Congress chose did not eliminate
the emphasis on competition and individual freedom of action in
rate-making." 28
25. Id. at 380, 49 U. S. C. at § 3. These requirements of the Act expressly bind
the carriers; they are not merely admonitions addressed to the Commission to guide
its administrative judgment. Hence there is no foundation for the assertion made by
a railroad attorney before a section of the American Bar Association that the Anti-
trust Division "contends that the freight rates must be made by individual railroads
. . . without regard to the standards of rate-making found in the Interstate Com-
merce Act." Smith, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries,
14 I. C. C. PRAc. J. 18r, 188 (1946).
26. 24 STAT. 382, 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1940). Only
where such findings have been made does the Commission have any authority to pre-
scribe rates. Pending consideration of the lawfulness of new rates, the Commission
may suspend them for a period not exceeding seven months. Proceedings before the
Commission are cumbersome, costly, and protracted. Shippers should not be deprived
of the benefits of competition on the theory that the right to litigate before the Com-
mission is an adequate substitute. An example will illustrate the effectiveness of such
procedure. In 1937 the producers and shippers of anthracite coal, with the support of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and of the United Mine Workers of America,
complained to the Commission that rates on that commodity were too high, On Octo-
ber 1o, 1945, the Commission granted a reduction of 25 cents. Its order was contested
by the carriers in court, and upheld on July 12, 1946 (Gardner v. United States, 67
F. Supp. 230 (D. N. J. x946)). Meanwhile a general rate increase had been approved
by the Commission. Of the 41 complainants, shipping approximately 70% of the total
output of anthracite, 17 went out of business during the course of the litigation. See
Dumbauld, Book Review, 34 GEo. L. J. 557-56o (1946).
27. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (1940). For the terms of
§ 5 as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 STAT. 456, 480 (1920)), as
amended by the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 (48 STAT. 211, 217),
as amended by the Transportation Act of 194o and now in effect (54 STAT. 898, 905
(1940)).
:28. 324 U. S. 439, 456, 458-9 (1945).
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Consequently it is clear that, subject to the foregoing limitations,29
Congress did not contemplate that carriers should be relieved from the
requirements of the antitrust laws merely because additional require-
ments were imposed by the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. It
is plain that the carriers are subject to and must obey both statutes.
To complain that this places the carriers under two masters, or super-
sedes the regulatory functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission
by "regulation by the Antitrust Division," 30 is to ignore the terms of
the pertinent legislative provisions and to indulge in a play upon words.
One might as well argue that for the same reason, as a regulated indus-
try subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, the railroads are relieved
from the operation of the internal revenue laws.
A most astounding, and perhaps revealing, assertion or admission
is made by Mr. Smith when he denies the existence of a "zone of rea-
sonableness" and advances the claim that the railroads are entitled to
rates that reflect a "reasonable maximum basis." He states that the
Interstate Commerce Act furnishes "a complete protection of the public
interest in the matter of rates. There are no gaps in that protection.
. . . It is a paradox to state that there is need of protecting the public
interest in cases where the rates do not exceed a reasonable maximum
basis."3 1  Mr. Smith is unique in holding, or at least in admitting pub-
licly, this view. His position entirely ignores the Supreme Court deci-
sions which plainly, recognize that under existing statutes there is a
"zone of reasonableness," to use Mr. Justice Cardozo's expressive
phrase, within which the carrier's initiative in making rates must be
respected.
8 2
The Commission is powerless to order the reduction of a rate
which is not in excess of a reasonable maximum.33  However, com-
29. It should also be noted that the Interstate Commerce Act requires carriers to
establish reasonable through routes and rates. An agreement among carriers for that
purpose would not violate the antitrust laws, if within "the legitimate area in which
that collaboration may operate." Id at 457; H. R. 2536, Hearings, 781.
30. Smith, supra note 3, in 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at 1122; DRAYTOw, op. cit. supra
note 3, passim.
31. 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at 1123-4. But the Supreme Court stated in the Georgia
case that "the Interstate Commerce Act does not provide remedies for the correction
of all the abuses of rate-making which might constitute violations of the antitrust
laws." 324 U. S. 439, 46o (1945). An analogous violation of the antitrust laws would
exist if competitors agreed to make an OPA "ceiling" a "floor."
32. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 294 U. S.
499, 5o6 (1935); Arizona Grocery Company v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
road Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932) ; Illinois Central Railroad v. United States, 263
U. S. 515, 522 (1924). To these authorities may now be added the Georgia case.
33. As stated at p. 461 in the Georgia case: "Within that zone the Commission
lacks power to grant relief even though the rates are raised to the maxima by a con-
spiracy among carriers who employ unlawful tactics. If the rate-making function is freed
from the unlawful restraints of the alleged conspiracy, the rates of the future will then
be fixed in the manner envisioned by Congress when it enacted this legislation. Damage
must be presumed to flow from a conspiracy to manipulate rates within that zone."
Moreover, in any event, Mr. Smith errs in believing that resort to the Commission is a
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petition among carriers might result in a rate, equally reasonable, but
below the reasonable maximum. Under the antitrust laws, the public
is entitled to the benefit of such rates, within the zone of reasonable-
ness, as would result from the normal effect of economic conditions
in the industry, without the intrusion of a rate-fixing combination re-
sulting in collusive "interference with the free play of competitive
forces." 8
If the views thus openly expressed by Mr. Smith, contrary to the
uniform pronouncements of the Supreme Court, are in fact covertly
entertained by railroad management generally, it may explain why they
oppose the application of the antitrust laws to their industry. En-
forcement of the prohibitions contained in the antitrust laws against
rate-fixing combinations would prevent the carriers from exacting in
every instance the maximum rate permissible under the requirement
of the Interstate Commerce Act that rates must be reasonable. In the
absence of a well organized hierarchy of rate-fixing combinations
among carriers, almost constituting a "private government", 35 there
would be the danger that some carrier might exercise the rate-making
initiative conferred upon it by existing law and offer the public a lower
reasonable rate than the permissible maximum.
III
THE PENDING ANTITRUST CASES
In the light of the foregoing review of applicable legal principles,
the issues raised in the Georgia case in the Supreme Court and the anti-
complete substitute for the benefits of competition. The Commission, and other regu-
latory bodies, have recognized that while regulation is beneficial in obtaining com-
pliance with certain minimum standards of service, it does not provide that stimulus
and incentive to improving service which is obtained by vigorous competition within
the industry. Virginia Stage Lines v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 79, 8, (W. D. Va.
1942) ; Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 21 M. C. C. 725, 747-
749 (1940); Colonial Airlines, Inc., Atlantic Seaboard Operation, 4 C. A. B. 553
(J944) ; Lake, Competition in the Public Utility Fields-, IO Miss. L. J. 197, 204-206
(1938).
34. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U. S. 533, 536 (1944);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 310 U. S. 15o, 221 (1940). The need
for competition, as well as regulation, in the railroad industry was forcefully expressed
by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "No one has recognized more fully than members of the
Interstate Commerce Commission the limitation of accomplishment through railroad
regulation. No one recognizes better than they the continuing need of competition to
secure satisfactory service. . . . To abandon competition in transportation, and
rely upon regulation as a safeguard against the evils of monopoly would be like sur-
rendering liberty and regulating despotism." BRANDEIS, BusINEss-A PRo-
FESSION, 295-299 (1933). See also MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FRE, MAN's LIFE 18i
(1946) ; FRANKFURTER (ed.), MR. JusricE BRANDEIS 134 (1932) ; LiEF (ed.), THE
BRANDEIS GuIDE To THE MODERN WORLD 179 (1941). Though Brandeis was at first
ridiculed for lack of "business experience, particularly in railroading" when he ven-
tured to differ with magnates of that industry (MASON, op. cit. supra, i86, 208), his
outstanding ability in the field of railroad matters was later recognized by competent
railroad spokesmen. See Bikl, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Regutation of Railroads,
45 HAxv. L. REV. 4 (93).
35. Fashion Originator's Guild v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U. S. 457, 465
(194).
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trust case brought by the Government at Lincoln, Nebraska, may now
be considered.
In the Georgia case in its amended bill of complaint, invoking the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution of the United States, the State of Georgia alleged
that the defendants (comprising some 2o railroad companies), through
their private rate-fixing machinery, have established arbitrary and
non-competitive rates which are detrimental to and discriminate against
the State of Georgia and its people. The allegation was also made
that manufacturers and shippers in the North are given an advantage
over those located in Georgia, and that the southern railroads are domi-
nated or coerced by the northern railroads. It is further charged that
the rates as a result of the conspiracy are so fixed as
(a) to deny to many of Georgia's products equal access with those
of other States to the national market;
(b) to limit in a general way the Georgia economy to staple agri-
cultural products, to restrict and curtail opportunity in man-
ufacturing, shipping and commerce, and to prevent the full
and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the State;
(c) to frustrate and counteract the measures taken by the state to
promote a well-rounded agricultural program, encourage
manufacture and shipping, provide full employment, and pro-
mote the general progress and welfare of its people; and
(d) to hold the Georgia economy in a state of arrested devel-
opment.
The United States as amicus curiae filed a brief in support of the State
of Georgia, advancing two contentions: (i) that a case or controversy
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was presented by
the amended bill of complaint filed by Georgia; (2) that the antitrust
acts support, and the Interstate Commerce Act does not preclude, the
injunctive relief sought. The Supreme Court on March 26, 1945, ren-
dered its decision, sustaining both of these propositions.86
Regarding the question of jurisdiction, it is sufficient to say here
that the Court followed previous decisions authorizing a state to sue
as parens patriae. The dissenting minority thought that the Court
in its discretion and in the interest of a more efficient administration
of justice should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction, remitting the
parties to a district court of proper venue.37 They also believed that
the National Government was exclusively authorized to represent the
36. A dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in which Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Jackson joined.
37. 324 U. S. at 47o (1945).
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people as parens patriae in the vindication of their rights under the
antitrust laws.38
The Court held that while Georgia could not recover damages
even if the conspiracy alleged were shown to exist,39 nevertheless in-
junctive relief was not precluded.
40
The basis of this decision was that Georgia was not seeking to
upset any existing tariff but simply to free the rate-making process
from "practices which the anti-trust laws condemn and which are not
sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Act." This would restore to
the industry "that degree of competition envisaged by Congress." Any
injunction which might be issued against the alleged rate-fixing com-
bination would thus provide relief of the very sort which is customarily
granted in antitrust suits. Such relief was the only adequate remedy
available since the alleged combination was outside the scope of admin-
istrative control-in fact without such relief effective regulati9n would
be stultified. 41 Thus the Georgia case is a clear decision that the anti-
trust laws apply to rate-fixing combinations in the railroad industry even
though the industry is also subject to regulation in certain respects
by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In the complaint filed by the Government at Lincoln, Nebraska,
on August 23, 1944, against numerous western railroads, the Western
Association of Railway Executives, the Association of American Rail-
roads, two railroad banking firms (J. P. Morgan & Co., Inc., Kuhn,
Loeb & Co.), and sundry individual defendants, violations of Sections
i and 2 of the Sherman Act were charged, having the effect of vesting
in eastern financial interests control of transportation in the western
part of the United States. It was alleged that such control is exer-
cised through the railroads' private rate-fixing machinery and other
organizations for collusive action in such manner as to maintain collu-
sive and noncompetitive rates, as well as to prevent and retard im-
38. Id. at 474.
39. Id. at 453, citing Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company, 260
U. . 156 (1922).
40. Since the relief sought by Georgia against the alleged rate-fixing combination
and conspiracy is not a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, § 16 of
the Clayton Act is not a bar to injunctive relief. That section provides that no one
but the United States may obtain injunctive relief against common carriers subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act "in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, super-
vision, or other jurisdiction" of the Commission. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§ 26 (1940). Cf. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 297
U. S. 500, 513 (1936) ; Central Transfer Company v. Terminal Railroad Association,
288 U. S. 469, 473-5 (i933) ; United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co.,
284 U. S. 474 (1932).
4r. 324 U. S. at 455, 459-60, 461-62. The dissenting opinion regarded the dis-
tinction between the alleged conspiracy and the rates resulting therefrom as a futile
"verbal maneuver" for the reason that the state could not show injury without showing
that the conspiracy would result in unlawful rates, or that without the conspiracy law-
ful rates other than those now in force would prevail. Id. at 481-2. Hence judicial
relief by injunction would be a "futility" or "idle gesture." Id. at 487.
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provements in service and facilities. By depriving the public of the
benefits of low-cost competitive transportation rates and facilities, it
was alleged that "the functioning of the national economy as a whole"
was impaired "by preventing the full utilization of the Nation's natural
resources, productive capacity, and purchasing power." The scope of
the conspiracy charged was specified in twenty enumerated practices
whereby collective control over the rates and services furnished by indi-
vidual railroads was effectuated. Among the instrumentalities used
to impose this control were the Association of American Railroads,
the Western Association of Railroad Executives, and an arrangement
known as the "Commissioner Plan, Western District," established
under the so-called Western Agreement which became effective on De-
cember I, 1932.42
The complaint alleged that under the Western Agreement any
railroad desiring to make a change in its rates or services, in the event
of protest by any other party to the agreement, was prevented from
putting such change into effect until after reference of the dispute
to the Western Commissioner. In the event that his proposed solu-
tion was not accepted by parties to the controversy, the matter was
then referred to the Committee of Directors established under the plan.
This committee was composed of representatives of financial interests
connected with the respective railroads, as distinguished from the oper-
4ting managements, and held its meetings in the Board Room of the
Bank of The Manhattan Company at 4o Wall Street, New York City.
The defendant banking firms, it was alleged, controlled and handled
substantially all financing operations and security issues of the defend-
ant railroads (except to the extent that competitive bidding is now re-
quired by law), and defendant J. P. Morgan & Company, Inc., or its
predecessor, participated in the organization of the defendant Associa-
tion of American Railroads.
The complaint recited instances of interference by the alleged
combination with the management of western railroads. It is stated
that in 1938, when farmers and grain men in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Kansas proposed to- donate a shipload of wheat to the people of China
and requested the defendant railroads to transport such wheat to ocean
42. The complaint alleged that after the existence of the Western Agreement was
brought to the attention of the Department of Justice and a copy thereof was requested
on April 9, 1943, the Agreement was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission
on April 14, 1943, and the parties to the Agreement stated that they had adopted an
amendment thereto purporting to cancel the Agreement as of April 23, 1943. The
complaint charged that notwithstanding said purported cancellation, the unlawful prac-
tices inaugurated under the Agreement had not been abandoned, and the defendants had
made public statements asserting their intention to continue operation in the future
under the same or a similar plan; and that the defendant Charles E. Johnston, who was
serving as Western Commissioner under the plan, had continued to act in the capacity.
of Chairman of the Western Association of Railroad Executives.
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ports at rates lower than those then in force, such reduction in rates was
prevented by the action of defendant Western Association of Railroad
Executives, in adopting a resolution providing that "no reduction from
normal tariff rates be authorized in Western Territory for movement of
wheat to 'ports for charitable distribution to the common people of
China." Slow-down agreements, to prevent prompt delivery of perish-
ables by carriers who might have been able to furnish more rapid ser-
vice than other parties to the agreement, establishing uniformity of
delivery time, are described in the complaint, as well as the efforts of
the railroads to retard the growth of motor transportation. Agree-
ments between railroad interests and pipe line owners with respect to
the transportation of oil are also set forth as well as arrangements
for maintaining high rates on iron and steel from the plant at Geneva,
Utah, erected by the Defense Plant Corporation.
In the light of the foregoing summary of the complaint, 43 it is
clear that the restraints charged by the Government constitute much
more than an attack upon the rate bureau or conference technique as
such,4 4 and hence the District Court appropriately held that it stated
a cause of action notwithstanding the temporary immunity afforded to
joint action through rate bureaus under Certificate No. 44, issued by
the Chairman of the War Production Board on March 20, 1943, pur-
suant to Section 12 of the Small Business Mobilization Act of June i i,
I942.4 i Accordingly, the Court on September 27, 1945, denied de-
fendants' motions to dismiss the suit. At the same time certain of
defendants' requests for a bill of particulars were granted.46  There
would seem to be little doubt regarding the correctness of the Court's
conclusion that the allegations contained in the complaint, if proved,
would constitute a clear violation of the antitrust laws.
IV
NoN-LEGAL FACTORS IN RATE-MAKING
In commenting on the Georgia case and the case at Lincoln, Mr.
Dickinson, in the address above referred to, states:
"While the pending proceeding at Lincoln, Nebraska, and the
suit of the State of Georgia in the United States Supreme Court
43. A more detailed summary of the complaint is given in Judge Delehant's opin-
ion in United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F. R. D. 510, 515-516
(D. Neb. 1945).
44. Id. at 523.
45. 56 STAT. 357 (i942), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1112 (Supp. II, 1942). The terms of
that section and of Certificate No. 44 are set forth in 4 F. R. D. at 519-20. Certificate
No. 44 remained in force until October i, 1946. In the Georgia case the Supreme
Court commented in a footnote upon the effect of that certificate, finding "that in no
respect would it be a bar to the present action." 324 U. S. at 459.
46. 4 F. R. D. 510, 534 (,945).
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raise interesting and important legal questions with respect to
the anti-trust laws and their application to a regulated industry
like the railroads, it does not seem to me that the strictly anti-trust
feature of the campaign of the Department is the most important
or significant one from a practical standpoint. The pending anti-
trust suits are the instrument and vehicle for promoting far-
reaching and drastic changes in the existing structure of railroad
rates in this country." 47
While of course from the standpoint of railroad management questions
arising under the antitrust laws may be an unimportant factor in the
overall problems of operation, the "strictly antitrust feature" of the
pending litigation is of fundamental importance from the standpoint of
antitrust enforcement. From this standpoint, the application of the
antitrust laws in the field of railroad transportation is just as vital as in
any other segment of American industry. It is the duty of the Depart-
ment of Justice to enforce the antitrust laws, and it is in the public inter-
est that those laws should be enforced, even though some inconvenience
is thereby caused to the corporations concerned in the conduct of their
affairs and business.
Whether as a practical result of these suits any "far-reaching and
drastic changes in the existing structure of railroad rates in this coun-
try" would come about depends upon the extent to which the existing
rates are maintained as the result of practices violative of the antitrust
laws. No change in the rates could come about as the- effect of the anti-
trust suits except such changes as would be caused by the elimination
of the illegal practices condemned by those laws. The scope and magni-
tude of the changes would depend upon the degree to which the present
rates are the result of unlawful manipulation.
To the extent that existing rates reflect legitimate economic con-
siderations such as the cost of service, wages and other proper operating
expehses, etc., they would not be affected by the results of a victory for
the Government in an antitrust suit. Only that portion of existing
rates which represents the result of successful conspiracy among the
carriers to maintain rates different from those which would otherwise
be maintained in the absence of illegal practices would be affected by the
elimination of such practices. Apart from action taken in order to
eliminate the effect of violations of the antitrust laws upon the rate-
making process, the Antitrust Division has no function with respect to
rates. It has no voice in determining what rates shall be established, or
what principles of rate-making shall be utilized in establishing them.
Consequently, Mr. Dickinson is in error when he assumes that the
. 47. Dickinson, mupra note 3, in 12 I. C. C. Prec. J. at 936.
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Department of Justice is espousing any particular theory of rate-mak-
ing.
48
The remainder of Mr. Dickinson's discussion is devoted to a
defense of rate bureaus. In so far as he advances the argument of con-
venience, it may be replied that it would doubtless also be convenient to
companies engaged in other lines of business than railroading to be
permitted to establish bureaus and associations to pass upon proposed
price changes by companies in the industry. The mere fact that rail-
roads are subject to regulation (i.e. to legal obligations to which other
businesses are not subject) does not relieve them from the legal obliga-
tions which they share in common with all businesses.
Mr. Dickinson points out that the railroads have employed the
practice of conference and consultation between competitors "ever since
their rates have been controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, for the purpose of giving preliminary consideration to proposed
rate changes and to the bearing of those changes on the rate structure
as approved or ordered by the Commission." 49 In this connection it
should be noted that, in fact, organizations for discussion and agree-
ment upon rates among competing carriers were employed and in exist-
ence long before the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.
Public sentiment against such rate associations and pooling agreements
led to the restrictive provisions embodied in the Interstate Commerce
Act as originally adopted. 0
It should also be observed that it is pure subterfuge to say that the
rate bureaus examine proposed rate changes merely to determine
whether they are in conformity with the Interstate Commerce Act and
with the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The power
of the rate bureaus extends to the consideration of all proposed rate
changes, and the grounds upon which they are approved or disapproved
48. Starting with the assumption that the Department is advocating in the Georgia
case the "distance" principle of rate-making, or the "industrial development" principle,
it becomes easy for Mr. Dickinson to point out that these principles are valid only
within limits and can become mutually contradictory and self-destructive, and that
other principles, such as cost of service, must also be considered. But nowhere in the
Government's amicus brief in the Georgia case is there any language urging adoption
of any particular rule of rate-making.
49. 12 I. C. C. PRAC. J. at 944.
5o. As early as 1858 the presidents of the trunk lines united in New York "in a
conference to effect a restoration of harmonious relations, just principles of action, and
a remunerative tariff," and in 187o an important pool was organized by the lines be-
tween Chicago and Omaha. MCPHERSON, RAILROAD FREIGHT RATES IN RELATION TO
THE INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 166, 170-71, 248, 251 (909).
The Cullom Committee in its report of January IS, 1886, did not recommend either
the prohibition or the kegalization of pooling. SEN. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., ist Sess.,
Part I, 2Oi (886). § 5 of the Act as passed prohibiting'pooling. Albert Fink, Com-
missioner of the Trunk Line Association, and George R. Blanchard, head of the Cen-
tral Freight Association territory pool, were witnesses before the Committee. Other
pooling agreements were discussed during debate. 17 CONG. Rzc. 7282 (1886).
656 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
are not confined to considerations of legality. Business policy and expe-
diency undoubtedly enter into the determinations made by rate bureaus.
Mr. Dickinson himself does not claim that the function of the bureaus is
limited to such tasks. He states only that a part of their work consists
in testing proposed rate changes by Commission standards, and says
"insofar as they do this, they perform preliminary work which would
otherwise fall upon the Commission." 51
"Insofar as they do this," however, the rate bureaus are performing
work which ought to be performed by the traffic and law departments
of the several railroads. The mandates of the Interstate Commerce Act
prescribing legal standards with which rates must comply are directed
to the individual carriers. A carrier violating such provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act is responsible for its own shortcomings, and
cannot hide behind the skirts of its competitors. It is the customary
function of a railroad's law department to advise the carrier regarding
the legal requirements with which it must comply in order to avoid
running afoul of the law. Collection of pertinent factual data regarding
rates and rate proposals is a normal function of a railroad's traffic
department. There is, therefore, no justification for the establishment
of a private government by the carriers collectively to pass upon the law-
fulness of proposed rate changes under the pertinent provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act and the standards established by decisions of
the Commission.
When Congress, in response to an overwhelming popular demand
to curb the abuses of railroads, established the Interstate Commerce
Commission, it did not authorize that body to delegate its duties to any
private group. Much less may such a private group usurp the Commis-
sion's duties by their own action. Had the people been contented with
the functioning of the private organizations of competing railroads to
fix rates, they would not have clamored for legislation resulting in the
establishment of the Commission. There is a clear distinction between
public authority and public officers on the one hand, and private organi-
zations and executives on the other, even when the same individuals
occupy dual capacities, as was the case when during the war the rail-
roads were taken over for a short time following a strike and high rail-
road officials were commissioned as officers in the Army.
Thus, Mr. Dickinson makes an unwarranted assumption when
he says: "There is, therefore, no ground for supposing that the rates
which result from bureau action are different from those which the
Commission itself would prescribe." 52 Congress and the public ex-
pect the Commission, and not a private organization of railroad execu-
51. 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at 950.
52. Ibid.
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tives, to perform the public trusts which have been committed to the
Commission. This is true even if the volume of business which the
Comrnission would have to handle would be increased by the abolition
of rate bureaus.
Mr. Dickinson repeatedly refers to the fact that if rate bureaus
were abolished "the resulting increase in the work of the Commission
would be so enormous as to clog the channels of Commission action
and possibly delay the process of rate changes to the point where the
Commission might well be brought into serious disrepute"; that the
elimination of rate bureaus "would completely clog the Commission
and utterly hamstring its effectiveness"; and that "the bureaus are in-
dispensable auxiliaries of the Commission in the performance of its
regulatory task." 53 Even if all this were so, the remedy should be
sought in improved administrative efficiency and increase of personnel
in the Commission, rather than by the Commission's abdicating its
functions in favor of a private government composed of railroad execu-
tives and established by agreement of ostensibly competing corporations.
Mr. Dickinson dilates at length upon the evils and abuses of un-
restricted competition, which existed prior to passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and resulted in unstable and discriminatory rates, re-
bates, favoritism between shippers and localities, and other evils. But,
as he concedes,5 4 those who favor enforcement of the antitrust laws do
not thereby call for abandonment of the benefits of regulation. It is
generally agreed that competition is not sufficient as the sole means of
protecting the public from the railroads. Competition is of little ben-
efit to shippers and localities situated at points having access only
to a single railroad.55  Regulation is necessary and desirable in the
public interest. No one disputes this. The fact that such regulation
is provided by law, however, is no justification for the assumption
that thereby the desirability of competition is eliminated.
Mr. Dickinson believes that there are "three complete and con-
clusive arguments" against the enforcement of the antitrust laws
against rate bureaus if the Department is sincere in its views that the
53. Id. at 945, 948, 949.
54. Mr. Dickinson says: "Doubtless the Department takes the position that all of
these undesirable results will be satisfactorily prevented by the action of the Commis-
sion, and that in relieving competition from the regulatory influence of the Bureaus it
is not proposing to emancipate it from the Commission's regulatory power." Id. at
at 948. It is gratifying to note that one spokesman of the railroads at least recognizes.
that the enforcement of the antitrust laws does not mean the repeal of the Interstate
Commerce Act or the abolition of the regulatory functions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Mr. Drayton and Mr. Smith either do not realize this or will not admit
it. See DRAYToN, op. cit. supra, note 3, and Smith. supra, note 3, in 12 I. C. C. PRAc.
J. at 1117, ii29.
55. On this point see the testimony of the late Joseph B. Eastman in S. 942, Hear-
itjs, 820-21.
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undesirable results of unrestricted competition will be satisfactorily
prevented by the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission."0
The first of ,these three arguments is that if unregulated copipeti-
tion would admittedly result in abuses which would have to be corrected
by the Commission, then.there is no reason for seeking to bring com-
petition of that kind into existence in order that it may be restrained.
This argument is sophistry, because, unless the Interstate Commerce
Act were repealed and the Commission abolished, which admittedly
no one is advocating, it would not be "unregulated competition" which
would result from the enforcement of the antitrust laws and the elimina-
tion of illegal restraints upon competition by carriers.
The second argument is that "if, in the end, the Department
proposes to rely upon the Commission to establish and enforce a sound
rate policy, then it stultifies itself in its contention that its present cam-
paign is necessitated and justified by the alleged unsoundness of the
present rate structure which has admittedly been shaped in conformity
with the Commission's policy."7 The fallacy of this argument is the
assumption that the rates resulting from the operation of private rate
bureaus are the same as those which would result from the operation
of competition, free from restraints imposed in violation of the anti-
trust laws, and subject to regulation by the action of the Commission
in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act. As has been pointed
out above, it is specious to argue that rate bureaus are merely a means
of applying the standards set forth in the Interstate Commerce 'Act
and in Commission decisions. Rate bureaus are free to, and do, make
determinations in accordance with business policy and economic expe-
diency. Rate bureaus are a unilateral instrumentality, even when ship-
pers are permitted to be heard before the secret decision is reached; and
this method of determining rates is subject to practically the same com-
plaint which led the Cullom Committee in 1886 to recommend the enact-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act upon the ground that "The
public interest demands regulation of the business of transportation
because, in the absence of such regulation, the carrier is practically and
actually the sole and final arbiter upon all disputed questions that arise
between shipper and carrier as to whether rates are reasonable or'
unjust discrimination has been practiced." 5S
Mr. Dickinson's third argument is that if the Department relies
upon the Commission to prevent the evils requiring regulation, there is
no excuse for increasing the difficulties and lessening the effectiveness
56. 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at 948.
57. Ibid.
58. SENt. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., ist Sess., Part I, i76 (1886).
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of Commission action "which would inevitably be the result of abolish-
ing and destroying the rate bureaus." 59 As has been stated above,
even if the increase in the volume of business which Mr. Dickinson
anticipates were actually to result, the remedy should be sought else-
where than in private usurpation of public regulatory functions en-
trusted by Congress to the Commission. But if carriers were free to
initiate rates without the unlawful restraints imposed by rate bu-
reaus, is it likely that the vast volume of business which is feared would
actually result? If lower rates were put into effect, satisfying the ship-
pers, the anticipated increase in litigation before the Commission could
only result if vexatious proceedings were instituted by other carriers.
Even if the volume of litigation did increase, the Commission in dis-
posing of such litigation would be performing one of the functions for
which it was established. Mr. Dickinson's argument is of the same
sort as the one that private feuds and vendettas should be encouraged,
in accordance with ancient Kentucky custom, in *order to prevent the
courts from being clogged with criminal cases.
The undesirable consequences which Mr. Dickinson anticipates
from the elimination of rate bureaus are quite different from the calam-
ities which Mr. Smith expects to occur. Mr. Smith states that if rate
bureaus were abolished "rates in all probability would be 'frozen', and
no carrier would be willing on its own initiative to change any rate
of real importance." On the other hand, Mr. Dickinson anticipates
violent fluctuations and "chaotic oscillations." 1o In view of this
divergence of opinions, it is perhaps permissible to believe that the
effect of the abolition of rate bureaus would in fact be less revolutionary
than either of these spokesmen expect.61 As stated previously, the
enforcement of the antitrust laws would eliminate only such rate infla-
tion as results from artificial manipulation of rates in violation of the
antitrust laws. Upon the re-establishment of normal competition be-
tween carriers, a stable level based upon legitimate economic consider-
ations would doubtless be achieved.
59. 12 I. C. C. PRAc. J. at 948.
6o. Dickinson, supra, note 3, in 12 I. C. C. PRAC. J. at 950; Smith, supra, note 3,
in 12 1. C. C. PRAC. J. at 1128.
6i. To avoid misunderstanding it may be well to emphasize that, besides their
questionable practices as private rate-fixing instrumentalities, rate bureaus may per-
form useful and legitimate functions in connection with conveniently handling the
mechanics of tariff publication and facilitating negotiations between carriers and ship-
pers. An allowable area of collaboration between carriers in the establishment of
through rates is also recognized. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U. S.
439, 457 (1945). Since no one advocates any interference with the performance of
such lawful functions, there is little reason to anticipate the abolition of rate bureaus.
As the matter was put by a representative of the Department of Justice: "We do not
complain of rate bureaus as such, but of rate bureaus as is-if I may use that expres-
sion." H. R. 2536, Hearings, 98I.
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CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion of the applicable statutes and Su-
preme Court decisions, and analysis of the issues involved in the two
pending major antitrust cases against rail carriers, the writer of this
article concludes that the antitrust laws clearly do apply to common
carriers subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, not-
withstanding the extensive regulatory powers conferred upon the In-
terstate Commerce Commission by that act in its present form. The
belief is also justified that the antitrust laws should continue to apply
to the railroad industry, thus regulated. The public should receive
the benefit and protection furnished by both the antitrust act and the
Interstate Commerce Act; there is no reason why the public should
be required to rely upon only one of those statutes. Insofar as the
antitrust laws are concerned, there is no greater difficulty in inter-
preting and applying them in the case of carriers than in the case of
any other industry. There exists no confusion or uncertainty which
would warrant any legislation granting carriers immunity or exemp-
tion from the operation of the antitrust laws. Such legislation would,
without adequate ground therefor, confer upon carriers a status of spe-
cial privilege.
